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AbstrAct: while offering a public welcome of communicative participation, a communicative 
dark side of the moderate enlightenment project emerged. moderate enlightenment’s corollary 
companion to wresting power from a limited few is the staggering sense of confidence in the 
universal ground of assurance that is “bad faith”1 —we fib to ourselves that we can stand above 
history and affect the future. absolute conviction of universal access to truth propels through 
methodological confidence, undergirding the era of “the rational” pursuit of truth, transporting 
the individual into an ethereal delusion—that one can stand above the historical moment of 
engagement and cast judgment. This essay calls into question the common assumption that com-
munication begins with the individual. we offer a critique of this assumption in accordance with 
radical enlightenment scholarship, calling forth a return to otherness that renders the construct 
of individual secondary to that which is met.
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This essay underscores a familiar critique—the conventional understanding of the 
enlightenment is a failed project with devastating everyday communicative consequenc-
es. This essay questions a conventional understanding of the enlightenment represented 
in caricature form by what alexis de Tocqueville called individual. in the language of 
those examining two competing understandings of the enlightenment, moderate and 
radical, this essay presupposes that the problem rests within the moderate rendition of 
the enlightenment. This philosophical and practical differentiation is central to nu-
merous contemporary philosophical critics and proponents of the life-giving side of the 
enlightenment who include Fernand Braudel and margaret Jacob2. henceforth, when 
this essay refers to the enlightenment and its devastating influence on human commu-
nication, the hegemony of what is now called the “moderate” enlightenment guides the 
essay.
it is no accident that the scottish enlightenment gave birth to adam smith’s 
     1. J.P. sartre, Being and Nothingness, new York, washington square Press, 1956, p. 83.
     2. a. Gare, Reviving the radical enlightenment: Process philosophy and the struggle for democracy. 
Keynote address, Sixth International Whitehead Conference, salzburg, 2006, p. 4-5.
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treatise on capitalism and adam Ferguson’s dissertation on civil society. confidence 
in individual and collective advancement was at the heart of both the moderate and 
radical enlightenment. This change in philosophy embraced the individual and the 
inevitability of progress, spurring early and long-standing positive consequences, free-
ing persons from the imposed authority of the church and the communicative dic-
tates of an aristocratic few. arran Gare3 describes the radical enlightenment as having 
ideas of civic humanism that were promoted by radical thinkers in the 18th century 
who began to synthesize the ideas of nature enthusiasts. Gare argues that radical en-
lightenment thinkers continued with the liberating tradition of Renaissance thought 
and ultimately stood in opposition to atomistic and utilitarian ways of thinking by 
moderate enlightenment advocates. Gare makes a distinction between the moder-
ate and radical enlightenment in that the moderate enlightenment invited in a new 
social order that was a new oligarchy of wealth (p. 10). moderate enlightenment 
thinkers also defined freedom in terms of one’s capacity to control life by increasing 
pleasure and reducing pain4. Gare argues that radical enlightenment thinkers went 
underground until the end of the eighteenth century, therefore, its development was 
less coherent than what has become the idea of a solitary mainstream enlightenment. 
There is opposition between moderate and radical enlightenment perspectives, yet 
public opposition is still not sharply defined. according to Gare, the most important 
proponent of Radical enlightenment is Johann Gottfried herder, who embraced the 
tradition of civic humanists and opposed a mechanistic view of nature5. herder forged 
an “ethics of self-expression or self-realization, calling on nations and individuals to 
express the potentialities unique to them” 6. herder embodied radical enlightenment 
as he did acknowledge diversity of cultures and multiplicity of voices. This multiplic-
ity of voices and diversity of cultures is key to herder’s principle of radical difference. 
herder’s (2001/2) principle of radical difference was in response to the moderate en-
lightenment thinkers who posited that humankind always remained the same across 
peoples, cultures, and historical moments. Through this principle of radical difference 
herder recognized that people, cultures, and historical moments are always changing.7 
These differences between moderate and radical enlightenment thinking could be sub-
tle at times and jarring at times. This essay offers a critique of the enlightenments and 
finds a larger deception in moderate enlightenment thought, while finding connections 
between radical enlightenment thought and Postmodern thought. in essence, the dif-
ference between the moderate enlightenment and the radical enlightenment pivots 
on a small number of differing metaphors: individualism and freedom; individual pos-
session and common concern; mechanism and organicism; and, finally, scientism and 
multiplicity of competing story-laden traditions. in the words of Gadamer, the radical 
     3. a. Gare, 2006.
     4. a. Gare, 2006, p. 10.
     5. a. Gare, 2006, p. 11.
     6. a. Gare, 2006, p. 11.
     7. J. G., von herder, 2001/2, p. 246-256.
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enlightenment points to truth, and the modern enlightenment points to control of the 
human environment based upon the word “method.”
inTRoDucTion
This essay both celebrates the welcome of individual ideas and contends with the 
communicative consequence of a volatile mixture—the individual and a universal as-
surance of rationality, which breeds a phenomenological lie with devastating empirical 
consequences for human communication: individualism. a consequence of moderate 
enlightenment was the universal assurance of a naturally given truth offered the plat-
form from which the individual and individuality that appropriately contended with 
tradition morphed into a dismissive stance, rejecting the voices and ideas prior to one’s 
own birth, permitting the illusion of standing above history and traditions. while an 
enlightenment was a much needed corrective to a time period governed by hegemonic 
influences, the eventual lie that emerged grounded in universal assurance of moderate 
enlightenment not only gave false hope but also insulated human beings from oth-
erness. This essay first offers a critique of individualism. second, the essay unmasks 
the enlightenment’s dark side, undue methodological confidence, which has long-term 
destructive communicative consequences. Third, this essay calls for a rhetorical turn 
toward otherness and leads to a conclusion that says farewell to modernity, welcoming 
a notion of postmodernity that makes a rhetorical turn unable to be dismissive of other-
ness, whether another culture, tradition, or narrative structure. 
The empowerment of the individual through rationality steeped in universal assur-
ance initiated the beginning of a communicative crisis in the west. The communicative 
problem was not and is not now the individual, but a philosophical system of universal 
assurance through rationality that functions as the tool for individualism unresponsive 
to the multiplicity of traditions within which the human finds identity. The rhetorical 
turn suggested by this essay celebrates individuality while rejecting individualism as 
phenomenologically inaccurate.
inDiviDualism
new ideas can transform into something contrary when taken to excess or deficien-
cy. such was the important insight of aristotle8 in defining the virtues with awareness 
that “this” ceases to be “this” and becomes “that” when the focus of attention shifts. 
For this moment, philosophically and pragmatically, the articulation of the dangers of 
excess and deficiency is helpful for understanding the communicative consequences of 
the individualistic dark side of the enlightenment.
From a postmodern questioning of unfettered confidence in human agency, 
progress, and efficiency tied to universal access to truth, the moderate enlightenment 
     8. aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, new York, oxford univ. Press, 1998, p. 44.
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was a moral cul de sac. The tyranny of the church moved to the tyranny of a disengaged, 
self-absorbed communicator. The successes of the enlightenment are apparent, but the 
price paid for such confidence in the individual was and is acute. such concern about 
the excessive consequences of enlightenment confidences began with the work of de 
Tocqueville in Democracy in America; the second volume warned about the dangerous 
potential for a new form of tyranny—the tyranny of individualism. arguably, the most 
important contribution of postmodernity was the critique of agency and authorial intent 
in its rejection of the illusion of control. we live in a world as dialogic companions with 
creation, not the controllers of life. The rejection of a moderate enlightenment view of 
agency is a return to uncertainty tied to the ground of tradition, but in this case compet-
ing traditions. This essay suggests that this philosophical contribution was essential to 
move back to the question of a universal, but differently: back toward attentiveness to 
a phenomenological reality that rejects moderate enlightenment certainty. we simply 
discovered the danger of misplaced confidence in progress and in an agency that seeks 
to further itself, intentionally inattentive to its surroundings. 
The notion of individualism emerges when narrative awareness of traditions that 
shape consciousness is lost, leaving them forgotten or taken for granted. in volume two 
of Democracy in America, de Tocqueville introduces this term that now dominates the 
landscape of the west. 
Individualism is a recent expression arising from a new idea. our fathers knew only 
selfishness.
selfishness is a passionate and exaggerated love of self that brings man to relate 
everything to himself alone and to prefer himself to everything to himself alone and to 
prefer himself to everything. 
individualism is a reflective and peaceable sentiment that disposes each citizen to 
isolate himself from the mass of those like him and to withdraw to one side with his fam-
ily and his friends, so that after having thus created a little society for his own use, he 
willingly abandons society at large to itself . . . individualism proceeds from an errone-
ous judgment rather than a depraved sentiment. it has its source in the defects of the 
mind as much as in the vices of the heart.9 
individualism is not the same as a selfishness that seeks to horde for one’s own pur-
poses. instead, its error lies in its attempt to live in a world where one can stand above 
the fray. The impulse to critique and judge from outside or above defines the detach-
ment of individualism. individualism comes with philosophical sanction, but eventually 
results in selfishness and lack of concern for the other.
charles Taylor suggests that this view of the self defines an identity that is disen-
gaged, located outside of nature and society rather than being defined in terms of things 
located outside the self, that treats things external to the self with rational instrumental-
ity to serve the welfare of self and others, which has led to “an atomistic “construal of 
society” consisting of individual purposes.10 in the communication field, the terms “self-
     9. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, new York, anchor, 1969, p. 482-483.
     10. c. Taylor, Philosophical arguments, cambridge, ma, harvard univ. Press, 1995, p. 7.
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actualization,” “self-growth,” “self-determination,” and “self-expression” all point to the 
pragmatic and philosophical linkage between progress and the self. This disengaged 
self seeks accumulation of experience rather than awareness of the situatedness of com-
munication with others. 
hannah arendt connected individualism to tyranny dependent upon the “social”11 
that formed the unity of the self-appointed individual. her story and de Tocqueville’s 
guide Taylor’s philosophical/pragmatic reading of the inner evolution of the story of 
the self within the west, directing attention to a tyranny that continues to gather mo-
mentum long after de Tocqueville’s warning. concern about individualism is not new; 
however, we must recognize that unreflective praise of the individual invites a commu-
nicative “banality of evil”12 that provides a different mask for tyranny without changing 
its destructive power. arendt and Taylor foreground a phenomenological challenge to 
individualism—not out of ethical consideration, but out of a phenomenological fact: 
individualism is a human deformity, an existential lie.
Years later it is arendt, as one of the premier critics of the enlightenment, who chal-
lenges this new hegemonic form. she makes two major conceptual moves with the term, 
differentiating it from the constructive need for individuality and uniting it with the 
foundation of totalitarianism.13 This same concern propels the work of charles Taylor, 
who articulates concern over fragmentation that he describes as people “less and less 
capable of forming a common purpose and carrying it out.”14 Fragmentation is a weak-
ened connection to and a lack of concern for otherness. as with most acts of misplaced 
confidence, unforeseen consequences emerge. undue confidence in an independent 
agent offers a temporary sense of protection, until existence breaks in by “saying” that 
control is not solely within the power of the self, disrupting what we thought forever 
true, already “said.” confidence in the forever “said” of detached control confines us 
within a moral cul de sac and is the mirage unmasked by postmodern scholarship.
a moRal cul De sac
There is often truth in clichés. For instance, the road to hell paved by good inten-
tions represents the path of individualism. empowering the individual with universal as-
surance of rationality yielded an unforeseen communicative crisis as the communicative 
agent accepted the philosophical and pragmatic claim of universal assurance of the pur-
suit of truth through rationality. This “new, ” “enlightened” commonplace assumption 
provided a foundation for three major communicative consequences: a universal man-
date to stand above tradition, an increasing commitment to effectiveness and efficiency 
rebelling against the restraint of tradition, and the confidence of a communicative agent 
seeking autonomous implementation of the above with ongoing contempt for the power 
     11. h. arendt, The human condition, chicago, univ. of chicago Press, 1998, p. 38.
     12. h. arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report of  the banality of  evil, new York, Penguin, 1977, p. 252.
     13. h. arendt, The origins of  totalitarianism, new York, harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1951.
     14. c. Taylor, Philosophical arguments, cambridge ma, harvard univ. Press, 1995, p. 282.
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of tradition that appeared in modernity as inept as a “Fiddler on the Roof.” The moral 
cul de sac was the assumption that the communicative agent could and should disavow 
the guiding insight of one’s own or another’s tradition.
confidence in the universal availability of reason undermined the power of tra-
dition. Yet, at first, communicative consequences were not catastrophic, but rather a 
dialectical invitation to creativity. individuality fueled the creativity of the Renaissance, 
a time of contention among traditions. Traditions require engagement; such is the com-
municative difference between a live and a dead tradition, of which Gadamer so often 
spoke. The renaissance is better understood as a moment of dialogic contention with 
tradition, for the power of tradition was not yet cast asunder. 
The turn to modernity moves dialogic contention to self-possessed dismissal of tra-
dition. The movement to individualism defines modernity, wrenching power from tra-
dition, attempting to remove traditions from the ground of human decision-making, 
privileging a new mantra of individual progress supported by the universal assurance 
of rationality over a “community of memory.”15 The move from dialogic contention 
with tradition to its dismissal is akin to william James’s discussion of disconfirmation, 
being ignored or “absolutely unnoticed”16 as the most fiendish way of being treated by 
another. individualism embodied a fiendish disregard for a community of memory that 
initiated detachment of the individual self from tradition. a community of memory is a 
“saying”17 not the “said” of a dead tradition. a community of memory lives with infinity 
of possibility, unlike the totality that assumes that one can possess, hold, and understand 
a given moment in time alone. individualism lives within the realm of totality and con-
trol, not within the infinity of embeddedness and response.
The moral cul de sac of disdain toward tradition found kindred soil with the roots 
of individualism. The communicator was given false assurance that life begins only in 
the now, forgetting the co-present interplay of the before, the after, and the now as each 
continues to reshape the other. speaking supplanted listening as the ground for conver-
sation; no longer was one attentive to ongoing conversation prior to persons meeting in 
conversation. listening is a direct requirement for a tradition to prosper.
confidence in universal rationality wrested away the restraints of tradition. The 
pragmatic by-product of this confidence was a sense of assurance that justified imposi-
tion of one’s own views. The communicative consequence of this confidence was jus-
tification through imposition, lessening restraint prior to speaking. confidence in the 
universal was accepted as a given, equivalent to a truth-seeking sense of gravity—it just 
was/is. confidence in the a priori propelled the communicative agent from engagement 
with the otherness of tradition to advocacy of one’s own ideas. The communicative 
consequence of ignoring engagement with a community of memory was the rejection 
of the phenomenological reality of otherness, the embeddedness of human life. The 
     15. R. Bellah, et.al, Habits of  the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life, Berkeley, ca, univ. of 
california Press, 1996, p. 104.
     16. w. James, The principles of  psychology, chicago, william Benton, 1952, p. 189.
     17. e. levinas, Alterity and transcendence, new York, columbia univ. Press, 1999, p. 93.
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universal foundation of the moderate enlightenment began the eclipse of otherness 
beyond the empirical and the immediate, masking situatedness, embeddedness, and 
tradition as core phenomenological tenets of communicative life responsive to other-
ness. This moral cul de sac gave rise to a communicator with undue confidence in a 
rationality unresponsive to the uniqueness of human traditions dependent upon ongo-
ing communicative practices. 
misPlaceD conFiDence 
moderate and radical enlightenments deconstructed power and authority resting 
with the few, unmasking the hegemony of privilege based upon fortune of birth rather 
than potential for contribution, opening the legitimacy of knowledge to many—these 
enlightenment rhetorics of freedom sought to expand human possibilities, yet the mod-
erate enlightenment fell short of this potential. Rhetorical empowerment of the indi-
vidual against the tyranny of collective and aristocratic proclamation was more than a 
“small step for mankind”; it unleashed a human technology arguably more important 
than the 20th century walk on the moon. This rhetorical transformation placed within 
the hands of the person was without precedent, bringing forth a rhetorical technology 
dependent upon human aspiration, not upon the dictates of the privileged.
each philosophical/pragmatic paradigmatic breakthrough carries both hope and 
the seeds of its own destruction. intemperate embracing of unending hope constructs 
ideological rigidity that leads, ironically, to its own destruction. The rhetorical success 
of the moderate enlightenment carried within itself the seeds of its own corruption as it 
embraced the notion of universal truth. moderate enlightenment fostered ideological 
blindness, assuming the universal truth, value, and goodness of progress, efficiency, and 
individual autonomy. This trinity of moderate enlightenment “goods” initially freed 
human potential, but when this set of three coordinates was adhered to without reserva-
tion, without question, and without a natural dialectical counter offered by tradition or 
embedded life, it fostered, instead, a new form of tyranny: individualism.
Phenomenologically, the moderate enlightenment belief in the universal forged a 
communicator disembedded from the ground of tradition as the modern prototype of 
communicative competence. we uplifted the disembedded communicative agent—dis-
embedded from the ground upon which human beings find “…the background of …
belief…”18 The disembedded communicator became the model of the competent com-
municator. 
it is the modern view of communicative competency that philosophers such as levi-
nas rejected.19 The detached, self-confident communicator imposing ideas upon an-
other represents a rhetoric that levinas abhorred. he rejected rhetoric unresponsive to 
the “saying” or “signs” that come before us and are all around us. he rejected the effort 
     18. c. Taylor, Philosophical arguments, cambridge ma, harvard univ. Press, 1995, p. 25. 
     19. R. c. arnett, The responsive ‘i’: levinas’s derivative argument. Argumentation & Advocacy 40: 2003: 
315-338.
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to turn communication into the “said”; what i “said” and what you “said.” The notion 
of “saying” speaks and listens simultaneously, but the notion of “said” imposes and tells. 
levinas’s work beckons forth a rhetorical turn to otherness, away from a humanistic 
commitment to agency and control. 
a form of rhetorical turn to otherness has long-standing attention in scholarly cir-
cles. Perhaps the most popular rendition of this call is Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone. 
The central theme of individualism as problematic finds agreement among numerous 
scholars, from macinytre (philosophy), to hauerwas (theology), to Bellah (sociology), 
to Barnett Pearce (communication/rhetoric), each calling forth a concern outlined at 
length by arendt and Taylor—the radical enlightenment project assumes narrative 
contention and multiplicity of constructed stories akin to what is now termed “postmo-
dernity.” 
The contribution of postmodern scholars was the unmasking of the lie of individual 
autonomy and support the radical enlightenment perspective. The “death of the sub-
ject” is not the death of the agent, but of an autonomous enlightenment agent, one who 
imagines oneself to stand above history—or, put differently, to walk on water. The call 
for a rhetorical turn to otherness welcomes individuality responsive to difference while 
eschewing individualism. This call for a rhetorical turn welcomes not individualism, 
but individuality willing to bear the burden of engaging otherness fraught with fragility 
and error, a radical enlightenment approach. This rhetorical move to otherness as-
sumes a natural burden of recognition of rhetorical interruptions, not control driven by 
self-occupied dreams of ever more progress; this rhetorical turn eclipses the hegemonic 
power of the enlightenment that calls us to be “an army of one.” 
with the turn to individualism, confidence shifts from public exchange of multiple 
ideas to individualistic exhortation of a given position. with the universal in place, the 
fulcrum on which communicative meaning rests shifts from tradition to the notion of 
the self. This misplaced confidence in the ability of the human to stand above traditions 
and seek advancement dependent only upon one’s own resources leads to the obvious 
misstep of individualism, but more subtly to a place of conformity that arendt called 
the “social”20 a place where individualism overtakes the public realm only to invite an 
irony—conformity of agreement on the importance of individualism that blurs public 
and private, leading both philosophically and pragmatically to an inevitable conform-
ity in the west. Rhetorically, the key is to unmask the parts of the enlightenment that 
ran amok with undue confidence in the university of rationality and its companion, 
individualism. 
unmaskinG The enliGhTenmenT DaRk siDe
Two scholars, hannah arendt and charles Taylor, of differing historical moments, 
warn us of the dark side of the enlightenment project resulting from universal support 
for rationality. arendt’s (1998) critique of the “social” and Taylor’s (1995) discussion of the 
     20. h. arendt, The human condition, p. 38.
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sources of the self display a form of equifinality21 differing paths to a similar destination—
conformity, agreement to embrace an individualistic illusion. Differently, but equally 
convincingly, arendt and Taylor stress that narrative footholds or grounds upon which 
deliberation can and should occur counter the illusion of individualistic wisdom that 
masks the consensus of the “social,” the byproduct of the moderate enlightenment. 
arendt understands the “social” as a place that blurs public and private, making 
excellence in public accomplishment difficult and private intimacy impossible. The sep-
aration of public and private life permits both a common world (public) and intimacy 
(private) that “…prevents our falling over each other…”22 Participation in both private 
and public life permits a natural dialectic of questioning while providing two different 
places from which one finds significance. individualism sought to privilege the private 
over the public, diminishing both and leading to conformity around the mystique of the 
self. 
From a sociological perspective, the “social,” the collapsed space of public and pri-
vate life, was the failed experiment of modernity. From a psychological perspective, the 
self as an independent agent is also a failed experiment of modernity. Taylor and arendt 
point to two moral cul-de-sacs that move us inadvertently from the ground of tradition 
to the arrogance of our ability to stand above, aloof from, and untainted by situated 
experience. Both metaphors, the “social” and the self, represent the philosophical and 
pragmatic faux pas of the arrogance of modernity tied to the primary enlightenment 
metaphors of undue confidence in the independent agent, progress, and efficiency. The 
rhetoric of the moderate enlightenment deconstructed the hegemony of a few, leaving 
us within the hegemony of the many, an island of social consensus. individualism pre-
supposes a rhetorical turning that misreads the phenomenological reality of otherness 
and creates a mirage, omitting recognition of the manner in which identity of person-
hood emerges from the embedded nature of tradition, persons, and events. 
The ironic communicative twist of the moderate enlightenment was that the direct 
challenge of the hegemony of undisputed authority was supported by the authority of 
universal assurance. This assurance created a mirage designed to control perceptions of 
reality, inviting a communicative crisis. The first principle for remedying this communi-
cative crisis is the naming of this mirage.
when individualism no longer seems to offer what it claimed was possible—happi-
ness—it continues to live in what Gordon allport referred to as a state of “proprium”,23 
in which a given action no longer claims conviction, but continues in habitual action. 
one finds energy from unreflective doing, a habitual meeting of daily patterns. correct-
ness then equates with habituality, not with responsiveness to a unique question encoun-
tered in a given historical moment. individualism is a form of proprium unresponsive to 
     21. von Bertalanffy, General systems theory: Foundations, development, applications, new York, Braziller, 
1967, p. 46; klir, an approach to general systems theory, new York, van nostrand Reinhold co., 1969. 
     22. h. arendt, 1998, p. 52.
     23. G. allport, Becoming: Basic considerations for a psychology of  personality, new haven, Yale univ. Press, 1955, 
p. 41.
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the changing phenomenological reality that shapes life as a journey. individualism is a 
guidebook of the detached self taken to all the “right” places and monuments, neither 
knowing nor caring about the stories of a people, a country, or a community that shaped 
a community of memory before one took a snapshot and named a place within a static 
frame. individualism nourishes a detached self, creating a phenomenological fiction 
walking above a story of otherness. This essay eschews individualism not as ethically 
wrong, but as blind to the phenomenological realities of communicative life—embed-
ded in, situated within, and tainted by the ground upon which one walks.
in this historical moment, we use the idiom postmodernity. This term suggests that 
we live in a juncture, an unformed or incomplete space that lies between modernity 
and something not yet understood. in this space, the individualistic dark side of the 
enlightenment is decentered, not destroyed. For instance, postmodernity does not lose 
the communicative agent, but challenges the communicator’s dream state of “bad faith” 
of detached self-reliance, rejecting the universal ground for rationality. Postmodernity 
brings the human communicator back to natural soil, resituating the communicative 
agent within toil, burden, and the mud of everyday life, rejecting the pristine assump-
tion of universal support for the rational pursuit of ideas. it requires us to disclose the 
connection of “rationality” to narratives of power and interest. This ironic moment 
embraces diverse philosophies that question the enlightenment commitment to the un-
disputed autonomy of the communicative agent and universal assurance. individualism 
that supports a self-detached reading of human events renders response akin to “social 
consensus.” martin Buber called this consensus psychologism,24 thinking one knows the 
motives of another better than that person knows them. what is missed is the “thing 
itself,” now lost within the subjective read of the communicative agent. in a postmodern 
age of diversity, such a reading becomes not only psychologism, but a form of “interper-
sonal colonization,” missing attentiveness to diversity within a community. 
DiveRsiTY anD “To The ThinGs Themselves”
we live in an ironic moment in which those questioning enlightenment presupposi-
tions and those continuing to champion their viability join in similar communicative 
concern—concern for the consequences of the destruction of the public sphere. indi-
vidualism in our culture moved us from the demand for public evidence to the “right” 
of individual proclamation based upon personal preference, what macintyre christened 
as “emotivism”,25 more than upon evidence. competing philosophies sit in joint lament 
over the emergence of what one colleague called “the death of public evidence.” To 
reject the moderate enlightenment does not suggest the rejection of public evidence, 
only the admission of a phenomenological fact—each communicator works from bias, 
interests, and narrative ground from which rhetorical construction of temporal truth 
     24. m. Buber, 1971.
     25. a. macintyre, After virtue: A study in moral theory, notre Dame, in, notre Dame univ. Press, 1984, p. 
12.
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and decision-making find life in human community. one must weigh any rhetorical act 
from within its biased frame, with full knowledge that one cannot escape the taint of 
one’s own ground—in either assertions or evaluations of others. The irony is that diverse 
philosophical systems lead to the same conclusion—multiplicity needs a vibrant public 
arena and a public accounting for the “why” and direction of decisions.
without a universal standard, the individual marshals emotivistic support for truth. 
This essay suggests not a return to the hegemony of undisputed authority, but a rhetori-
cal turn back to traditions: not to one metatradition, but to awareness of multiple, com-
peting traditions. The irony is that diversity of positions understands that individualism 
does not generate more ideas; it legitimizes imposition that seeks to lessen rather than 
enhance difference. imposition is the heartland of the “social.”
The key to a re-engaged public arena is that conversation about ideas, activities, 
products, and goods must take center stage, deprivileging personal preference. Rhe-
torically, this move is a call back to content; phenomenologically, it is a move back “to 
the things themselves”.26 De Tocqueville’s insight pointed to the contemporary need for 
a rhetorical turn that challenges modern assumptions of communicative competence, 
rejecting enlightenment assumptions as anachronistic and unresponsive to the com-
plexities of narratives in contention in a postmodern world. The rhetorical turn suggests 
that the enlightenment project of the universal ideal should give way to a postmod-
ern phenomenology attentive “to the things themselves,” not to the wish of ideas spun 
from the self and then forced upon the world. eventually, the natural world claims its 
right once again—reminiscent of Burke’s notion of “recalcitrance”27 of life as ground 
upon which we walk, not ground above which we walk—taking us to a rhetorical turn 
that reminds us that communicative willfulness is phenomenologically unresponsive to 
the world before us. The rhetorical turn to otherness is a return to communicative 
backgrounds/traditions as a rhetorical mission that stresses assumptions counter to the 
universal. as the moderate enlightenment dream was unmasked as a wishful mirage, 
the consequences for the study and application of human communication emerged as 
paradigmatically stunning, moving us away from focus upon the communicative agent, 
efficiency of method, and expectation of progress to a rhetorical turn toward the oth-
er situated within tradition(s), toward learning that emerges from rhetorical interrup-
tions and from error and the unexpected, and toward the frailty and limits of human 
progress. 
The embedded nature of human existence is the emerging center of a petite number 
of ideas defining postmodern existence. such is the reason that Benhabib28 and chris-
tians and Traber29 revisit the notion of universal values, but differently, not connected to 
     26. e. husserl, Logical investigations. new York, Routledge, 2001, p. 101.
     27. k. Burke, Permanence and change: An anatomy of  purpose, Berkeley, ca, univ. of california Press, 1984, 
p. 168.
     28. s. Benhabib, Situating the self: Gender, community and postmodernism in contemporary ethics, new York, 
Routledge, 1992.
     29. c. christians and m. Traber, Communication ethics and universal values, Thousand oaks, ca, sage, 1997.
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the assumption of control and progress, but tied to lack of control and the ground within 
which we walk, stand, and decide, the muddy ground of phenomenological reality, not 
of wish fulfillment. Postmodernity rejects assumptions of a universal “standing above,” 
but embraces minimal universal assumptions as outlined by sissela Bok.30 This essay, 
however, suggests that the notion of phenomenological reality of embeddedness may 
open the conversation more productively than recycling the term universal. This argu-
ment, not solvable here, is a central question for this century. 
The rhetorical turn to otherness welcomes not the dream of moderate enlighten-
ment individual possession, but embedded responsiveness to the traditions of the other 
and the pragmatic necessity of welcoming fragility and error as interlocutors that ad-
dress us in the human condition. as stated above, the culprit may not be the enlighten-
ment commitment to universals, but to the particular universals it embraced. The rhe-
torical turn of this essay is not to relativism, but to a universal understanding of a basic 
phenomenological set of realities. First, the world does not begin with me. second, ob-
session with efficiency leads to paradigmatic blindness that misses serendipitous oppor-
tunities for creativity. Third, a bad faith commitment to progress misses the obvious—
seasons and cycles, not linear growth, govern life. a non-humanistic phenomenological 
reading of communicative life begins with otherness that is not centered on persons. 
The descriptor of “necessary but not sufficient” connects persons to an expansive and 
non-humanistic view of otherness. without such a phenomenological understanding of 
communication, we embrace a communicative competence based upon assumptions of 
autonomy of agent, efficiency, and progress that renders communicative competence as 
deformity, ignorant of the phenomenological reality before us. This essay suggests that 
moderate enlightenment assumptions frame a type of communicative deformity, mis-
understanding the embedded nature of communicative competence. 
ReJecTinG DeFoRmiTY as communicaTive comPeTence
The communicative deformity offered by belief in universal assurance of rationality 
manifests itself in justified imposition, a form of communicative “manifest destiny.” im-
posing ideas upon another is the natural consequence of assuming that one walks with 
access to universal truth. communicative acts of imposition would be characterized by 
Buber as education driven by telling, which he rejected as the antithesis of education 
and learning,31 much as Paulo Freire dismissed the “banking concept”32 of education, 
which lives on an assurance of conviction. 
at its best, the universal ground of rationality calls for public learning and experi-
mentation, not telling. Rationality that refuses to understand its situatedness and the 
necessity to engage difference offers assurance that propels acts of imposition in the 
form of imperialism or colonialism. innumerable critiques outline the communicative 
     30. s. Bok, Common Values, columbia, univ. of missouri Press, 2002.
     31. m. Buber, 1947.
     32. P. Freire, Pedagogy of  the oppressed. new York, continuum, 1970, p. 57.
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limits/dangers of these forms of imposition. They are deformed caricatures of construc-
tive impulses to protect a clan and the nomadic pursuit of land to assist the clan. Gad-
amer offers insight into the manner that logos and ergon, word and deed, co-inform and 
reshape one another until, in the aristotelian sense, one empowers word or action to 
the excess or deficiency of the other.33 The movement from protection of and gathering 
from the land for food production to imperialism and colonialism exemplifies the power 
of excess. The transformation from individuality to individualism follows a similar turn; 
individuality through the power of excess becomes individualism. The rhetorical turn 
toward otherness takes us from the illusion of self-detached individualism to the com-
municative grounds of multiplicity situated within ideas, narratives, and traditions that 
blur vision and simultaneously augment and texture life with difference. 
The RheToRical TuRn
The rhetorical turn toward otherness runs counter to a humanistic approach that 
assumes that communication begins with persons alone. The modern conception of 
otherness limited to the other person misses the otherness of situated ground upon 
which we stand. Postmodernity reminds us that difference emerges from the otherness 
that surrounds us phenomenologically, past and future. calvin schrag suggests that 
communicative praxis is “by, about, and for”34 something. The rhetorical turn to oth-
erness assumes that before the communication begins between persons, there is a by, 
about, and for upon which a communicator stands and among which a communicator 
is embedded. we meet the other as already a part of otherness.
 This essay advocates a phenomenological turn back to otherness, acknowledg-
ing embeddedness within a multiplicity of ideas, narratives, and traditions. This call 
for a rhetorical turn to otherness embraces the constructive side of the radical en-
lightenment—multiplicity—while retrieving a phenomenological reality: the embed-
ded nature of human communication. This rhetorical turn unmasks individualism as 
phenomenologically inaccurate, illuminating once again the importance of situated-
ness, embeddedness, and communicative life lived mired in the mud of standpoint. The 
moderate enlightenment’s unswerving confidence in universal assurance authorized the 
communicative agent to assume a detachment providing clarity of assurance, permitting 
and encouraging communicative imposition of one’s own ideas upon another, a type of 
“bad faith.”35 universal assurance underscoring confidence in ideas lays the groundwork 
for imperialism, colonialism, and their cousin, individualism. 
such confidence in one’s own ideas gathers power from the banality of the taken-
for-granted. in the guise of the “not so special and important” lurks what arendt termed 
     33. h.G. Gadamer, Dialogue and dialectic: Eight hermeneutical studies on Plato, new haven, cT, Yale univ. 
Press, 1980. 
     34. c. o. schrag, Communicative praxis and the space of  subjectivity. Bloomingdale, in, indiana univ. Press, 
1986, p. ix.
     35. J. P. sarte, 1956, p. 83.
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the insidious “banality of evil.”36 This essay understands individualism, distinguished 
from individuality, as one of the modern coordinates of the banality of evil. The trek 
from individuality to individualism leads to a moral cul de sac37 with serious implications 
for understanding communicative competence. This essay suggests that we live in a mo-
ment calling for a rhetorical turn from rationality supported by a universal assurance 
that gave rise to the modern conception of individualism to the phenomenological real-
ity of otherness that acknowledges the ontological reality of bias, allegiance, limits—an 
embedded communicative agent. 
as embedded communicators we live within the otherness of traditions, commu-
nities, environments, cultures, and narratives. To break the cycle of the dark side of 
the moderate enlightenment project requires decentering the communicative subject, 
whether speaker or listener,38 with the revisiting of phenomenological reality—the com-
munication of which we are a part started before we stepped forth and continues after 
our exit. Rhetorically, this understanding defines the limits of authorial intent— mean-
ing goes beyond the author. 
emmanuel levinas, the premier ethics scholar of the twentieth century, rejected 
two major assumptions of the west. First, he was hostile to rhetoric; he considered it 
a “telling” discipline disrespectful of otherness. second, levinas abandoned the phi-
losophy of humanism as simply not human enough. life begins for self and other before 
we are here. what makes us human is what we meet and what we find ourselves situ-
ated within; we are responders to, not controllers of, life. levinas rejected rhetoric and 
humanism as phenomenologically inaccurate portrayals of human life. once, however, 
one makes the rhetorical turn to an otherness disconnected from a western human-
ism, levinas’s project joins the insight of this essay. The rhetorical turn becomes one of 
response from ground not of our own making, but that emerges as a by-product as an 
embedded communicative agent reshapes human life. 
The ground upon which we stand— ideas, tradition, culture or narrative— be-
gins persuasive discourse before we speak. such a phenomenological reality takes the 
communicator to a rhetorical turn cognizant of self-implicative beginnings from ideas, 
tradition, culture, and narrative commitments and from response to temporal shifts in 
context and the historical moment that reshapes persuasive implications. This under-
standing of the rhetorical turn rests at the center of calvin schrag’s rejection of the 
modern view of epistemology.39 instead, he connects rhetoric to hermeneutics, detail-
ing how multiple texts inform a speaker/listener. an embedded communicative agent 
follows a similar course, linking the a priori with the now and with the yet to be discov-
ered. For schrag, the rhetorical turn revisits the persuasive nature of the ground(s) upon 
which one walks. Persuasion is not what we do—the embedded nature of life does it to 
us: “The rhetorical turn makes explicit this incarnation of the logos with discourse and 
     36. h. arendt, 1977, p. 252.
     37. R. c. arnett, 1998.
     38. c. o. schrag, 1986.
     39. c. o. schrag, 1986, p. 188.
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action in a hermeneutic of everyday life.”40 
consequences of the rhetorical turn are significant in that decentering becomes 
the postmodern “common sense.” vico detailed the importance of sensus communis.41 he 
worked with an assumption that one could sort out common sense in a given moment, 
as did Thomas Paine. however, postmodernity suggests that common sense is no longer 
common, but tied to particular petite narratives.42 what is common is what a commu-
nity has in common in its practices and experiences. when experiences and practices 
differ, disparity in common sense follows. 
 The movement to individualism crushed the power of common sense’s situat-
ing a life within a tradition, offering instead the illusion of decision-making by personal 
preference, macintyre’s “emotivism.”43 Postmodernity invites tradition back to the table 
of decision-making, only this time as tradition(s), acknowledging multiplicity. common 
sense in a postmodern age requires admission of the failure of the disembedded self 
and the necessity of a rhetorical turn to otherness that revisits the interplay of multiple 
forms of situatedness. This turn opens the philosophical and pragmatic door to tradi-
tion and the mud of everyday lives and finds identity informed by postmodern insight 
that one must negotiate a multiplicity of traditions. a rhetorical turn to otherness takes 
us from blind allegiance to tradition through blind allegiance to the self and finally to 
a temporal place of light—the decentered and dialogic world of interplay among tradi-
tions, historical moments, and communicative agents. The communicator works within 
a decentered understanding of humanness, one in which logos impacts us from multiple 
points of origin and temporality and in which the conversation does not begin with the 
self—a decentered world of persuasion. 
This project offers a rhetorical turn that unites three converging loci. First, the en-
lightenment, broadly conceived, offered a quantum change in human thought. The 
paradigmatic shift of ownership of ideas by the few to “idea addition” from many indi-
viduals unleashed human creativity that led to one major change after another, from the 
death of power by divine right to the Protestant Reformation to the industrial revolu-
tion. The rhetorical consequence of challenge to limited access to power was individual 
communicative freedom, a social good. second, the next move began a journey down 
a long and slippery slope of undue confidence in the self. confidence in universal assur-
ance provided a new form of ground, not the location of where one walked, talked, and 
worked, but in the ethereal air of rational pursuit of truth open to all. The rhetorical 
consequence was the repositioning of meaning and the starting point of discourse from 
the ground upon which one stands to the self. Third, not unlike most changes, these new 
insights carried remnants from the past. The change was a form of first order change 
(Bateson 1979) in which we changed the actors, but not the plot. we moved from adher-
     40. c. o. schrag, 1986, p. 193.
     41. G. vico, The new science of  Vico Giambattista, ithaca, cornell univ. Press, 1991.
     42. J. F. lyotard, The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge. minneapolis, mn, univ. of minnesota Press, 
1984.
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ence to unquestioned authority to the rejuvenation of the old assumption of assurance 
hidden behind yet another mask—the mask of universal rationality. This idealized/
constructed ground of unquestioned authority of the universal offered the human self 
a confidence previously unknown. The communicative agent with the claim of rational 
universal insight could impose power and influence to win the day. The communicative 
agent took universal rationality as the raison d’être, walking away from “primitive beliefs” 
situated in the ground/narrative upon which one’s life is constituted, disembedding the 
self from the natural soil of human engagement. The rhetorical turn toward an em-
bodied communicator, embedded within a background that shapes practices, virtues, 
and an understanding of the “good” returns to “old” questions, reviving the radical 
enlightenment commitment to multiplicity of story construction in opposition to the 
mechanical and individualistic rendering of the enlightenment under the term “moder-
ate,” which is better understood as extreme individualism. The radical enlightenment 
aligns with a postmodern sensibility that the universal was a moral cul de sac requiring a 
return to the recognition of the “embeddedness” of human life and multiplicity of nar-
rative commitments.
conclusion: RheToRical TouchsTones
This essay pays homage to postmodern insight that disrupted the moderate enlight-
enment’s hold upon us and, at the same time, suggests movement beyond a postmodern 
grasp. This essay engages postmodernity with an adieu—a good-bye accompanied by a 
sense of welcome. Good-bye and welcome emerge in the same breath. 
Postmodernity was and is a vital rhetorical juncture that calls into question the inde-
fensible assumptions resting in an arrogance centered upon primacy of the human self. 
The universal hope of rationality available to any person gives way to situated, blurred 
rationality positioned within petite narrative structures.44 Rhetoric takes on persuasive 
import without universal assurance of the supremacy of the agent, the importance of ef-
ficiency, or the inevitability of progress. a postmodern communicative home rests within 
the metaphor of “touchstone”45 rather than the metaphor of “universal.” a touchstone 
provides a temporal marker of location, a general indicator of direction without the 
definitiveness of an absolute—a hint or intuition of meeting a horizon.
The rhetorical touchstone of this moment is neither the self nor individualism, but 
a phenomenological reality of otherness. This otherness requires re-engagement with 
traditions, content, and difference. it is not the familiar, but the strange, the different, 
and the unknown that open the door to our 21st century, all pointing to life outside the 
self, constituting the rhetorical turn to otherness, to a phenomenological reality of em-
beddedness, to situated life with all its uncertainty, error, and fragility. The rhetorical 
turn to otherness bypasses humanism, heeding the advice of levinas: humanism is not 
human enough; otherness begins and continues before and long after our entrance.
     44. R. Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, new York, cambridge univ. Press, 1989. 
     45. m. Freidman, Martin Buber: The life of  dialogue, new York, Routledge, 2002, p. 357.
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otherness tied to metaphors such as diversity of touchstones, ground, and narra-
tives reminds us that otherness is the alterity before us. The rhetorical turn to other-
ness is a rhetorical turn to alterity—the assumption of this historical moment is not 
that we agree, but that our difference is what defines this moment, fuels learning, and 
casts ever anew the importance of rhetoric in this historical moment. Postmodernity is 
not an answer; it is a rhetorical interruption suggesting a call to learn once again. The 
medieval commitment to the trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric was a schema 
often framed as classical education, yet its development was in the 12th and 13th centu-
ries. in the 21st century, grammars are grounded in different narrative structures. The 
narratives bias logics, and rhetoric continues to sort out the differences. The rhetorical 
turn to otherness has roots in a medieval past that, in terms of historicity, has currency 
today. Rhetoric tied to otherness moves us from individualism to the historical moment 
in which we live, with a renewed call for a radical enlightenment, a time of difference 
where learning must trump telling and alterity keeps the conversation going, a recogni-
tion of the rhetoric of human life.
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